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ARTICLE

Germany’s German Constitution
RUSSELL A. MILLER*
Comparative lawyers, working with blunt taxonomies such as “legal families,” have
been satisfied with characterizing Germany as representative or a member of the
“Germanic-Roman” law tradition. The life of the Federal Republic’s post-war legal
culture, however, reveals a richly more complicated story. The civil law tradition, with its
emphasis on abstract conceptualism and codification, remains dominant. But it has had
to accommodate a new, vigorous constitutionalism that bears many of the traits of the
common law tradition, including judicial supremacy and a form of case law. This is the
encounter of discrete legal traditions within a particular legal system that H. Patrick
Glenn imagined. The dialogue between the civil law and common law traditions in the
German legal system has produced symbiotic effects. In this article, I suggest a number of
ways in which Germany’s prevailing civil law culture uniquely shapes and marks its
constitutional law regime, producing Germany’s distinctly German constitutional law.

* Russell Miller is the J.B. Stombock Professor of Law at Washington & Lee University School
of Law where his research and teaching focus on American public law, comparative law theory and
methods, comparative constitutional law, and German law and legal culture. He has published a
number of books and articles in these areas, including: Introduction to German Law and Legal Culture:
Text and Materials (forthcoming 2018) and, with Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the
Federal Republic of Germany (3d ed. 2012). Professor Miller is the Co-Editor-in-Chief of the German Law
Journal, which he co-founded in 2000 with Peer Zumbansen. Professor Miller wishes to thank Armin
von Bogdandy’s Dienstagrunde at the Heidelberg Max Planck Institute, which provided invaluable
feedback on this project. He owes a particular debt of thanks to that group’s Matthias Schmidt for
suggesting the title. This article also benefitted from feedback after presentations at the IACL
Roundtable “The Invisible Constitution: Comparative Perspectives” held at Melbourne Law School
(May 2016) and the symposium “Constitution-Making and Constitutional Design” held at the Clough
Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College (April 2015). Professor Miller
also wishes to thank the W&L Law students who helped him with research: Stephen Chovanec,
Hengyi Jiang, and Cadman Kiker. Work on this article was generously supported by Washington &
Lee University’s Frances Lewis Law Center and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and Public International Law (Heidelberg, Germany).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Not long ago I visited the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) with a group of my American law students. When
our tour of the Court reached the luminous, wood-and-glass hearing
chamber, our guide triumphantly declared: “Welcome to the only common
law court in Germany!”
It would have pleased the legendary comparative law scholar H.
Patrick Glenn to hear it.1 In his seminal work, Legal Traditions of the World,
he argues that legal systems such as Germany’s cannot be categorically
classified as emblematic of a single legal tradition.2 Glenn contends that
state legal systems are the sites of encounters between the world’s
complex, commensurable, and interdependent legal traditions.3 He uses
1. Sadly, McGill University Law Professor H. Patrick Glenn passed away in 2014. A memorial
essay in the American Journal of Comparative Law, a publication produced by the American Society of
Comparative Law (over which he presided as President at the time of his death), described him as
“one of the most respected comparatists of our time.” David J. Gerber, In Memoriam, H. Patrick Glenn
(1940 –2014), 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (2015); see also Daniel Jutras, Saying Goodbye to Professor H. Patrick
Glenn (1940–2014), MCGILL U. FAC. L. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.mcgill.ca/law/channels/
news/saying-goodbye-professor-h-patrick-glenn-1940-2014-239330.
2. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 368 (5th ed. 2014) (“All
categories are vague . . . all efforts at separation are arbitrary and artificial.”).
3. Id. at 43; see also H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
133 (2001).
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words such as “bridging,” “dialogue,” and “interchange” to describe this
unavoidable dynamic, which he imagined to be something similar to
Russian nesting dolls, with lateral traditions and subtraditions supporting
and complementing a system’s leading or primary tradition.4 The tour
guide at the Constitutional Court seemed to have all of this in mind,
implying that German constitutional law (embodied by the Constitutional
Court) represents the subaltern common law tradition asserting itself in the
German legal culture, which is predominantly shaped by the continental or
civil law tradition.
This is not a novel characterization of Germany’s post-war legal
culture. Others have remarked on the tension that resulted from the
encounter between the new constitutional law and the old civilian legal
order.5 In fact, the story is usually cast in less reconciliatory terms than
Glenn would have preferred. Germany’s ordinary courts, our tour guide
was suggesting, are the carriers of the German legal culture’s predominant
civil law gene.6 But the Constitutional Court represents a recessive —
albeit thriving — common law genetic adaptation that has gradually
conquered and colonized Germany’s civilian legal culture.7 According to
this account of developments in post-war German law, while facing
resistance from the ordinary courts and the German legal culture’s
entrenched civil law orientation, the Federal Constitutional Court
heroically overcame the system’s formalism and positivism in its commonlaw-like pursuit of constitutional justice. In fact, few courts have shaken
off the continent’s old civilian shackles and taken up the common law
judicial role with as much gusto as the German Constitutional Court.8 The
4. GLENN, supra note 2, at 366–67, 373–74.
5. See Thomas Dietrich, Bedeutung der Grundrechte im Zivilrecht, in 60 JAHRE GRUNDGESETZ–
VORTRAGSREIHE 97 (Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht der Universität Kassel ed., 2010). Dietrich refers
to a “krachende Konfrontation der Grundrechte mit dem geltende Zivilrecht . . . .” (“crashing
confrontation between constitutional rights and private law . . . .”). Id. at 101 (Miller trans.).
6. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 58–60,
63–72 (3d ed. 1985); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 76 (2014); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 31 (3d ed. 2007); John Henry Merryman,
How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1871 (1988) (“The ‘old’
individual rights . . . have largely been achieved and solidified in the work of ordinary courts quietly
applying the traditional sources (principally the civil codes) and methods of private law.”).
7. See Merryman, supra note 6 (“The rise of constitutionalism is thus an additional form of
decodification: the civil codes no longer serve the constitutional function, which has moved from the
most private of private law sources-the civil code-to the most public of public law sources-the
constitution.”); see also A. Pearce Higgins, The Making of the German Civil Code, 6 J. SOC’Y COMP.
LEGIS. 95, 96 (1905) (“[F]or the first time in the history of Germany, there came into being a
veritable common law, which, sweeping away all anomalies and local customs, was . . . to regulate the
relations of all the members of the German Empire in the most important details of private law.”).
8. Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and
Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. COMP. L. 194, 208 (2009) (“The Court’s record . . .
reveals a self-confident tribunal deeply engaged in Germans’ lives and politics . . . . The number and
range of cases in which the Federal Constitutional Court has acted to dramatically impact German
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Herculean role the Court now plays in the German polity might even make
a native common law jurist blush.9
This story of dynamic diversity and pluralism within the German legal
system (what Glenn referred to as “multivalence”) is an important facet of
Germany’s determined effort to confront and overcome its National
Socialist past,10 a process the Germans call Vergangenheitsbewältigung.11 In
this version of the story the civil law tradition helped to shape the
preexisting legal culture, and it functions as the negative frame against
which Germany’s post-war constitutionalism serves as a rebuke.12 As a
matter of substantive law, the fronts in this Kulturkampf especially involved
family law and gender equality, but noteworthy skirmishes have also taken
place in contract law, tort law, property law, and criminal law. The triumph
of German constitutional law (and its common law orientation), so the
myth would have it, required a number of innovative jurisprudential
devices that are now closely identified with German constitutional law. For
example, the Constitutional Court pioneered the idea that the
constitution’s basic rights must be regarded as “objective values”
applicable across the entire society — and not merely as a set of subjective
and negative limits on the state’s interactions with its citizens.13 Flowing
inevitably from this innovation, the Constitutional Court also concluded
politics are too great to systematically or comprehensively recount in this brief introduction.”); see also
B. S. Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some Judgments of the
German Federal Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 349, 359 (1986) (“The 1900 Civil Code could not have
survived without some very daring judicial interventions which, if not allowed by the term judicial
law-making, come as close as any Common law judge has come into making new law.”).
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–40 (1986); see also Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 177, 201 (1998) (“In the German case,
the commitment to Verfassungspatriotismus, or constitutional patriotism, results in the Constitutional
Court's unusual willingness to decide cases with important foreign policy implications. According to
Juliane Kokott, this willingness flows from the renewed German commitment to the Rechtstaat in the
wake of World War II — no questions are above or beyond the law. The Constitutional Court thus
conceives itself as an equal participant with the political branches of the German government in the
process of European integration.”).
10. GLENN, supra note 2, at 368–72.
11. See PETER REICHEL, VERGANGENHEITSBEWÄLTIGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND: DIE
AUSEINANDERSETZUNG MIT DER NS-DIKTATUR IN POLITIK UND JUSTIZ (2001); Thomas
McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY
623 (2002); see also Word of the Week: Vergangenheitsbewältigung, DEUTSCHE WELLE, http://www.dw.de/
vergangenheitsbew%C3%A4ltigung/a-6614103 (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
12. See Gerhard Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 781 (1980) (“It was
because of those very discontinuities in German constitutional history . . . that the German post-war
discussion centered on the failure of the German constitutions . . . . Above all, attention was turned
to the Weimar Constitution, that professionally engineered document, so widely acclaimed in its time,
such a dismal failure in operation.”) (internal quotation omitted).
13. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
BVerfGE 198, 1958 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lüth Case]; see also DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A.
MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 59–
62 (3d ed. 2012); Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837,
858–62 (1991).
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that the Basic Law’s objective values may be applied horizontally — albeit
indirectly — across all of German law, even in private legal disputes that
do not involve state action.14 Finally, the Constitutional Court championed
the use of proportionality in constitutional interpretation, giving itself the
discretion to weigh constitutional harm and consider constitutional
priorities on a case-by-case basis.15 Ultimately, this is the myth of the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz) completing the arch of Germany’s turbulent
constitutional history by subduing the country’s indigenous civilian
tendency toward formalism and positivism to truly and at last bind the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary to (constitutional) law and
justice.16
The story of constitutional common law’s triumph in Germany
depends on a number of fundamental premises, which I will survey and
mostly confirm in Section II. The first premise is that the civil law
tradition is the primary tradition in the German legal culture. The second
premise is that constitutional law, as practiced by the Constitutional Court,
bears many of the hallmarks of the common law tradition. The third
premise is that there is a tension — perhaps even a hard-fought rivalry —
between these different jurisprudential orientations in the post-war
German legal order. The final premise is that the German Constitutional
Court can claim victory in this struggle because it has succeeded in giving
the constitution, with its common law orientation, priority (as a legalcultural matter and not as a doctrinal matter of constitutional supremacy)
over the entrenched civil law tradition and especially the revered German
Civil Code.17
Yet, although there is considerable evidence of constitutional common
law’s ascendance in contemporary German legal culture, Glenn
understood that the encounters between legal traditions within a particular
system are reciprocal affairs. The post-war constitutional regime
profoundly introduced elements of the common law tradition into the
14. Lüth Case; see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13; Bernhard Schlink, German
Constitutional Culture in Transition, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 718 (1993) (“The Court found that
because fundamental rights had importance not only as subjective rights of citizens against the state,
but also as society’s most important values, they governed the entire legal order, including civil laws
that regulated the relationship of citizens to each other.”).
15. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 67; see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY
(2012); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002) (Julian Rivers trans.);
Schlink, supra note 14, at 729 (“While methodologically convincing decisions still occur every now
and again, there are many others that simply arise from the Court’s feel for what is indicated by social
and political life-for what is accepted and ‘fits’ into the social and political landscape. Decisions thus
encompass only the individual cases sub judice, and are expressed and handed down as such.”).
16. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] arts. 1(3), 20(3), translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
17. “The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order . . . .” Id. art. 20(3). (German
Bundestag trans.).
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German legal culture.18 But the old, predominant civilian legal tradition in
Germany has influenced German constitutional law, too. Glenn suggests
that the interaction of these legal traditions would “blur the distinction
between the two” and that both traditions would become subject to
“multivalent, bridging, complexity” involving “rejection, limitation,
accommodation or even adoption.”19 It is on this unremarked dynamic —
the civil law tradition’s influence on Germany’s constitutional law — that I
want to focus in this article. Section III documents the civil law tradition’s
symbiotic influence on German constitutional law. There is evidence of
this influence in the character of the constitutional text, in some
constitutional theory, in the lingering priority given to the legislature (as
opposed to the judiciary) to develop and refine the constitutional
framework, in the civilian character of the Constitutional Court’s
jurisdiction, and in the Constitutional Court’s civilian decisional style.
My analysis is significant for comparative lawyers’ work because it
suggests that German constitutional law — if it is to be studied and
understood at all — must be taken on its own complex, multivalent terms.
Of course, the common law/civil law interdependence I describe here is
just one such distinctly contextual facet of German constitutional law.
There are other influences — ranging from the expansive sweep of
political history to the contributions made by discrete individuals — that
make equally important explanatory and determinative contributions to the
tapestry of contemporary German constitutional law.20 As comparative
lawyers we ignore this thick web of meaning at the risk of engaging with
nothing more than a chimera of German constitutional law. The object of
comparative lawyers’ study cannot be an abstract classification or
taxonomic archetype of constitutional law, at least not if we want to be
saying anything about something.21 As this study demonstrates, the Basic
Law anchors a highly contingent and contextually determined
constitutional regime that features a unique mix of distinct kinds of
common law and civil law traditions and much, much more: it is
Germany’s German constitutional law.

18. Glenn notes the reverse phenomenon in the United States, suggesting that the civil law
tradition had come to shape American constitutional law. GLENN, supra note 2, at 265.
19. Id. at 374.
20. Pierre Legrand calls these elements “traces” and identifies the following as a non-exhaustive
list of possibilities: “traces of historical configurations enmeshed with traces of political rationalities
intertwined with traces of social logics interwoven with traces of philosophical postulates plaited with
traces of linguistic orders darned with traces of economic prescriptions interlaced with traces of
epistemic assumptions . . . .” Pierre Legrand, Negative Comparative Law, 10 J. COMP. L. 405, 419–20
(2015).
21. Contra David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153 (2017).
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II. HALF THE STORY: GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS THE
TRIUMPH OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OVER THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION
There is an almost messianic narrative about post-war German law
that suggests that the Basic Law has vanquished the formalistic and
positivistic impulses in the German legal culture that are the residue of the
civil law tradition’s historical predominance in Germany. This myth
depends on four premises. The first is that German legal culture is steeped
in the civil law tradition’s statutory formalism and positivism. The second
is that constitutional law, with its focus on judicial interpretation and caseby-case decision-making, resembles the common law. The third is that the
German Constitutional Court, as the guardian of the constitution (and,
thereby, the prophet of the common law tradition in Germany’s civilian
desert), has had to struggle against the enduring dominance of the civil law
in post-war Germany.22 The fourth is that the German Constitutional
Court has triumphed in this struggle, ushering in an era of previously
unattainable constitutional law and justice — of Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Each of
these premises has a basis in truth, which will be explored in this section.
Before turning to that endeavor, I will first offer brief definitions of
the “civil law” and “common law” traditions, which are two concepts that
are fundamental to this study.

A. The Civil Law and Common Law Traditions Defined
Throughout this article I refer to the “civil law” and “common law” to
represent two distinct legal traditions from among the many that find
expression in the world. These are old labels with considerable explanatory
force.23 They are also quite dangerous. In the worst cases they are asserted
as taxa — static and exclusive categories — into which many of the
world’s legal systems can be dumped in our mania to classify or map global
legal phenomena.24 Drawing almost satirically from the natural sciences,
comparative lawyers have sometimes called these categories “legal
families,”25 as if they represent empirically discoverable biological species.26

22. Kommers, supra note 13 (providing details about the Constitutional Court’s background,
including antecedent tribunals as well as the intentions and ambitions of the drafters of the Basic
Law, in which the Court is specifically identified).
23. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, René David: At the Head of the
Legal Family, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
24. See SIEMS, supra note 6, at 41–43.
25. See Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043 (2012);
H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 421 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006);
Jaakko Husa, Legal Families, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 382 (Jan M. Smits
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Elsewhere I argue that this kind of taxonomic thinking in comparative law
is perilous because it is superficial and allows us to ignore the dynamic and
discursive character of sociological phenomena such as the law.27 These
legal families (and other encompassing archetypes) seem to tell us so much
about a legal system only because they tell us nothing at all.
I do not use legal traditions as a taxonomic device. I am not interested
in trying to definitively classify Germany (or any other legal system) as
belonging to an exclusive legal family. First, I embrace Glenn’s definition of
“legal traditions,” which represent identifiable epistemic constellations of
normative information about ways of doing (and not doing) the law.28
Glenn explains: “[T]radition emerges as a loose conglomeration of data,
organized around a basic theme or themes . . . .”29 That information, he
argues, counts as tradition because it is carried forward from the past to
the present. I find that Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo have helpfully
clarified Glenn’s concept of “legal traditions,” concluding that they are
[a] set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal
system, and about the way the law is or should be made, applied,
studied, perfected, and taught.30
Second, I share Glenn’s conviction that many different legal traditions
can exist as part of a dynamic discourse within a single legal system. For
example, Glenn tells of the churning mix of Hindu legal tradition, Islamic
legal tradition, and British common law tradition in India.31 Hindu digests
“continued to be written through the arrival of the British,” Glenn
explains. But the “arrival of the British was to supplant both Hindu and
Islamic law as territorial law,” leaving these traditions with a “special
status, as personal laws of Hindu or Islamic people.”32 This colonial
“reception” of western law, perhaps better understood as the violent
imposition of the colonizer’s legal traditions,33 was repeated along the
knife-edge of western expansion in the world.34 Still, Glenn could
ed., 2006); Jaako Husa, Classification of Legal Families Today. Is it Time for a Memorial Hymn?, 56 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 11 (2004).
26. Pargendler, supra note 25, at 1050.
27. See generally Russell A. Miller, Comparative Law’s Taxonomy Problem (Apr. 15, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
28. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 12–14.
29. Id. at 16.
30. MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 2.
31. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 312.
32. Id. at 310–11.
33. See Upendra Baxi, The Colonialist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS
AND TRANSITIONS 46 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
34. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 345.
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conclude that “[t]he effect of English law on Hindu law [in India] was . . .
not immediate or abrupt, nor did it prejudice the legitimacy and availability
of classic Hindu sources. The change was more subtle . . . . ”35 Used in this
way, legal traditions merely provide a means for talking about the
multivalent legal attitudes that are in conversation within any legal system,
such as the interchange between the civil law tradition and the common
law tradition in Germany.
As a way of thinking about what the law is or should be, the civil law
tradition is commonly understood to be the heir to the Roman ius civile.36
This ancient provenance — and the civil law’s far-reaching reception
around the world — led David and Brierley to refer to it as the “first
family of laws.”37 Legal scholars play a prominent role in developing and
extending the tradition,38 even if the ideal source of law within the civil law
tradition is now a highly systematic and comprehensive code.39 It is the
legislator’s and professor’s law, not the judge’s. Judges are thought to play
an almost bureaucratic function in the formalistic, positivistic, and
deductive application of the code’s settled concepts to the facts of any
given case.40 The spirit of the civil law tradition, it is argued, has always
been its moral recognition of the individual.41 It is necessary to point out,
however, that this rough sketch of the civil law tradition glosses over what
many see as discursive diversity within the so-called civil law family. It is
often subdivided between French and German siblings.42 David and
Brierley felt obliged to call it the “Romano-Germanic family.”43 A
fundamental difference between these siblings is thought to be the high
degree of systematization found in the German codifications that is lacking

35. Id. at 311.
36. See MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 6.
37. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 33; see also MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra
note 6, at 3 (“The civil law tradition is older, more widely distributed, and more influential than the
common law tradition . . . . It should be added that many people believe the civil law to be culturally
superior to the common law, which seems to them to be relatively crude and unorganized.”).
38. See MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 56.
39. See id. at 27.
40. See id. at 36 (“The picture of the judicial process that emerges is one of fairly routine activity;
the judge becomes a kind of expert clerk . . . the judge’s function is merely to find the right legislative
provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically
produced from the union.”).
41. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 147–51.
42. “The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) appeared at the end, and the French Civil
Code at the beginning, of the turbulent century of the Industrial Revolution. The German Code
emerged from an intellectual and political background that differed in many ways from the
Enlightenment and revolutionary thought that informed the Code Civil. It is thus not surprising that
Germany and France have inspired somewhat different sub-traditions in the civil law world.” MARY
ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN
A NUTSHELL 38 (3d ed. 2008).
43. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 33.
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in the French Civil Code.44 This is one of the civilian features of German
constitutional law that I will illuminate in this article. For that reason, I
have to concede that I am really only talking about the reverse influence of
German civil law on German constitutional law, while at the same time
accepting that all of these labels represent dynamic and evolving
conditions depending on what kind of normative information is being
carried forward from the past into the contemporary life of the law in
Germany.
The civil law’s foil is imagined to be the common law tradition.45 The
common law does not share the civil law’s Roman roots (or at least not to
the same degree).46 It is the product of the Norman conquerors’ efforts to
govern occupied — and often hostile — England.47 This led to some of
the common law tradition’s most distinctive characteristics, including an
empowered judiciary working on a case-by-case basis with local norms and
in cooperation with local populations to settle on the most acceptable (or
least offensive) substantive rules to resolve disputes as they arose.48 The
galvanizing focus of the tradition was on the process leading to the court’s
jurisdiction over the case, and not the substantive resolution of the case
once the courthouse doors had been pried open.49 The accretion of these
judicial decisions is the case law that has priority in the common law
tradition.50 The common law is altogether less conceptual and less
systematic. It is inductively focused on facts, which we are told “are the
life of the law.”51 But here, too, I cannot neglect the practice of
recognizing distinct Anglo and American currents within the so-called
common law family.52 A key difference between the two, according to
David and Brierley, is the Americans’ unique and less rigorous application
of the rule of precedent or stare decisis.53 David and Brierley conclude:
Really, all that can be said with certainty about the American rule
of stare decisis is that, as compared to the corresponding rule in
England, it has an important limitation: the United States Supreme
Court and the supreme courts of the different states are not bound
44. See id. at 71.
45. See id. at 334 (“English legal structure is not the same as that of French law and it poses the
greatest difficulty for a continental jurist since it is, in fact, totally different to anything with which he
is familiar.”); MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 1–5; SIEMS, supra note 6, at 43–64.
46. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 309–11.
47. See id. at 311–18; GLENN, supra note 2, at 237–41.
48. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 237–41.
49. See id. at 254–55.
50. See id. at 243; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 366–67, 376–78.
51. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
52. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 397, 407.
53. See id. at 434–35.
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to observe their own decisions and may, therefore, operate a
reversal of previously established judicial practice.54
It is this kind of unbounded judicial authority, among other factors,
that convinces me of the temperamental link between the common law
tradition and constitutionalism. And so I have to concede that I may only
be talking about an American style of common law constitutionalism.
Glenn knew that the traditions that interested him were complex,
evolving, and contingent in confounding ways, and that they could only do
limited service as fixed concepts.55 Still, he believed that they maintained
“some form of external coherence.”56 It is in this spirit that I rely on such
traditions here, where they do just enough to allow us to look for the
surprising interplay of diverse approaches to the law in the context of the
German legal system.

B. The Predominance of the Civil Law Tradition in Germany
In any myth worthy of the name, a hero must achieve his
enlightenment by passing a test.57 In fact, the odds were long that the
common law tradition — with the priority and privilege it extends to
judges at the expense of the legislature — would gain a prominent
foothold in Germany. The German legal culture, after all, is definitively
civilian.58 The German Federal Justice Minister once insisted that
“German law is steeped in the tradition of the system of codified law that
has evolved throughout continental Europe and that has proven its worth

54. Id.
55. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 366–76.
56. Id. at 374; see also James R. Fox, Common Law, in DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 62 (3d ed. 2003); James R. Fox, Civil Law, in DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 55 (3d ed. 2003); HOLMES, supra note 51; MERRYMAN & PÉREZPERDOMO, supra note 6; GLENN, supra note 2, at 133, 237; Caslav Pejovic, Civil Law and Common Law:
Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 817, 819 (2001)
(“One of the basic characteristics of the civil law is that the courts main task is to apply and interpret
the law contained in a code, or a statute to case facts. The assumption is that the code regulates all
cases that could occur in practice, and when certain cases are not regulated by the code, the courts
should apply some of the general principles used to fill the gaps . . . . The most obvious distinction
between civil law and common law systems is a that civil law system is a codified system, whereas the
common law is not created by means of legislation but is based mainly on case law. The principle is
that earlier judicial decisions, usually of the higher courts, made in a similar case, should be followed
in the subsequent cases, i.e. that precedents should be respected.”).
57. “Our hero, then, has to qualify for the throne in two ways: he must pass a test in some such
subject as rain-making or riddle-guessing, and he must win a victory over the reigning king.” LORD
FITZROY RAGLAN, THE HERO: A STUDY IN TRADITION, MYTH, AND DRAMA 190–91 (1956); see
also JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (3d ed. 2008).
58. See LAW — MADE IN GERMANY 7 (2d ed. 2012), http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/LawMade_in_Germany.pdf (“German law belongs to the long-standing family of continental European
legal systems in the tradition of Roman law . . . . This legal family is characterised by its codified
system of legal provisions, e.g. in the form of statutes.”).
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even in difficult times.”59 German law is presented as an example of the
continental civil, or codified, legal tradition in most comparative law
projects,60 including the best-known English-language introductions to the
German legal system.61
The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or “BGB”), and the
prominence it enjoys in Germany, is the clearest indication of the farreaching influence the civil law tradition has had over German legal
culture.62 The Civil Code has been an intense point of pride for Germans
and is a leading export of one of the world’s leading exporters.63 The Civil
Code, after all, was a source of political and cultural unity for a longfragmented people.64 For more than a century the Civil Code has been
law’s foundation in German society. In one English-language introduction
to the German legal system the point is made this way: “In Germany, all
important legal issues and matters are governed by comprehensive
59. Id. at 3.
60. See, e.g., GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 63; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 49–75;
GLENN, supra note 2, at 133–80.
61. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION
TO GERMAN LAW 7, 9 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005) (“[T]he civilian tradition . . .
still provides a fair idea of what may be dubbed German legal culture.”); NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH
SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 3 (3d ed. 2002) (“The German legal system belongs to
the central European family of legal systems, broadly classified as civil law countries.”); HOWARD D.
FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE XXVII (4th ed. 2009) (“The
German legal system remains, generally speaking, a system of (positive) norms i.e. traditional German
legal thinking revolves, in the vast majority of cases, around the twin immutable ‘pillars’ of an
established system and norms regarded as authoritative.”); E.J. COHN & W. ZDZIEBLO, MANUAL OF
GERMAN LAW 3 (2d ed. 1968) (“German law is a member of a family of laws, which one might well
call the European Continental laws . . . . Notwithstanding many and striking differences between the
branches and members of this family, the basic structure . . . is very similar.”); GERHARD ROBBERS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 15 (4th ed. 2006) (“German law [has] the characteristics of a
codified legal system, in other words, one whose rules are laid down in legislation which cover all
aspects of the law. This characteristic is not the least of the factors which identify Germany law as
Continental European.”).
62. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.]; German Civil Code, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/230659/German-Civil-Code (last updated July 20,
1998) (“The concept of law embodied in the code was the gemeines Recht, the common law based
on the 6th-century codification of Roman law put in force by the emperor Justinian . . . . Although
altered to some extent by feudal law, customary law again came under Roman influence in the 15th
century, when Roman law was received into Germany in an effort to systematize customs and legal
institutions.”).
63. The BGB has strongly influenced civil law codifications around the world, including in
China. Indeed, the first English-language translation of the BGB was prepared by the Chinese scholar
Chung Hui Wang. See CHUNG HUI WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE — TRANSLATED AND
ANNOTATED WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND APPENDICES (1907); see also Russell A.
Miller, Law Land: Germany as a Legal Super Power, in AM. INST. FOR CONTEMP. GERMAN STUD. POL’Y
REP. (2015), http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/GAI-17-Germany-LawLand.pdf; Ernest J. Schuster, A Chinese Commentary on the German Civil Code, 8 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS.
247 (1907).
64. See NEIL MACGREGOR, GERMANY: MEMORIES OF A NATION (2014); see also Higgins, supra
note 7, at 96.
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legislation in the form of statutes, codes and regulations. The most
important legislation in the area of business law includes . . . the Civil
Code.”65 At the time of its enactment and entry into force, the Civil Code
was described in nearly breathless terms:
• “The greatest among [Germany’s] exploits is a Civil Code;”66
• “[The Civil Code is] a monument of legal learning and . . . one
of the ripest expressions of the aims and methods of modern
civil jurisprudence;”67
• “[The Civil Code] works an almost unprecedented revolution
in the jural life of the German Empire. It may well be
questioned whether an upheaval of like extent has ever taken
place anywhere;”68
• “[The Civil Code] is the most carefully considered statement
of a nation’s laws that the world has ever seen.”69
More than a century after its promulgation, the Civil Code is in force
almost exactly in its original form. One commentary sums up the wonder
of the Civil Code’s endurance in these terms: “The fact that the BGB has
lasted so long, providing legal solutions to a variety of social and economic
problems arising under imperial, social democratic, totalitarian and liberal
social state political regimes, provides a lasting tribute to the wisdom and
foresight of its drafters. The BGB has served Germany well.”70 Another
contemporary scholar simply called the Civil Code “one of the
masterpieces of European legal culture.”71
What makes the Civil Code — and the German legal culture it both
embodies and enraptures — so paradigmatically civilian? First, although it
is circular to say it, the Civil Code itself is profound evidence of the civil
law tradition’s grip on the German legal culture. After all, codification is a
central feature of the civil law tradition.72
65. LAW — MADE IN GERMANY, supra note 58, at 7.
66. Frederic William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code, in 3 THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 474, 476 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
67. Ernst Freund, The Proposed German Civil Code, 24 AM. L. REV. 237, 254 (1890).
68. Arthur Ameisen, Some Features of the New Civil Code of the German Empire, 33 AM. L. REV. 396,
407 (1899).
69. Higgins, supra note 7, at 105 (quoting OTTO FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE xvii (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900)).
70. Joseph J. Darby, The Influence of the German Civil Code on Law in the United States, 1999 J. S.
AFR. L. 84, 84 (1999).
71. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The German Proposal of an “Anti-Discrimination”-Law: Anticonstitutional
and Anti-Common Sense: A Response to Nicola Vennemann, 3 GER. L.J., no. 4, 2002, at para. 1,
https://www.germanlawjournal.com/volume-03-no-05.
72. See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 61, at 3 (“One of its basic features is that a country which
has adopted the civil law tradition would usually have as the core of its legal system five codes,
normally including civil law in the Roman law definition, criminal law, civil procedural law, criminal
procedural law, and commercial law.”).
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Second, as with the other achievements of the civil law tradition, the
Civil Code traces its roots to Roman law.73 Yet the German process of
codification did not involve a direct adoption of the Justinian legacy.
Under the influence of von Savigny, the Civil Code instead sought to
Germanize the Roman heritage so that it would reflect the spirit of the
German people, a concept von Savigny called the Volksgeist.74 According
to Catherine Valcke, the French civilian orientation (surely the world’s
“other” great codification) is characterized by a single conceptual
framework, namely the revolutionary force of rationality. Only rationality
could explain the violent rupture with the historical inertia of tradition and
caste that ordered French society prior to the Revolution.75 “Centuries of
history were to be erased,” Valcke explains, “and a whole new nation
rebuilt out of ideas.”76 As its complex, systematic structure demonstrates,
rationality also has a vital place in the German Civil Code. But Valcke’s
point is that the BGB accommodated the experiences Germans had made
with law prior to codification. That von Savigny’s historicism ultimately
played a fundamental role in the German codification process is evidence
of the Civil Code’s irrational, culturally contingent possibilities. It might be
better to understand the Civil Code as a rationalization and codification of
the historical facts of German law — it was not a clean, rational, and
revolutionary break with the jurisprudential past. Still, the Roman legacy’s
rationality and systematics are strongly present in the Civil Code, perhaps
most obviously in the fact that it is arranged in five parts, or “books,” that
roughly reflect the Pandects’ division of the Roman law into its relevant
fields.77
Third, the Civil Code invariably embodies the jurisprudential features
that are typically attributed to the civil law tradition. It is an expression of
the preference for positively enacted legislation, as opposed to judge-made
law. But the Civil Code is no ordinary statute. It is highly systematic, it has
comprehensive ambitions, and it aspires to a tightly fitted ordering of life’s
affairs. The Civil Code superseded all prior-existing law. It is viewed as a
complete and absolute normative framework. In its completeness, it is
thought to provide cherished certainty and predictability. Judges are meant
73. See Catherine Valcke, Comparative History and the Internal View of French, German, and English
Private Law, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 133, 137 (2006) (“It is well-known that German law shares the ius
commune heritage of French law and indeed resembles it in many ways.”).
74. Susan Gaylord Gale, A Very German Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical School, 18 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 123, 131 (1982).
75. See Valcke, supra note 73, at 139; see also Sarah Maza, Luxury, Morality, and Social Change: Why
There Was No Middle-Class Consciousness in Prerevolutionary France, 69 J. MOD. HIST. 199 (1997)
(illustrating the social debate that was raging among thinkers prior to the Revolution).
76. See Valcke, supra note 73, at 139.
77. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO
MODERN LAW 7, 21 (1938); FOSTER & SULE, supra note 61, at 3.
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only to apply the Civil Code’s clear and systematic framework. To achieve
all of this, the Civil Code relies extensively on conceptual logic and
abstraction in identifying prescribed solutions to human dilemmas.
The Civil Code is conceptual, rational, scientific, and deductive. This is
a defensible characterization of Germany’s thoroughly civilian legal
culture, which Pierre Legrand describes as “the land of Rechtswissenschaft, of
seemingly relentless legal conceptualism and systematization, or apparently
incessant categorical thinking, the country where one appreciates being
told one is a good dogmatician.”78

C. The Common Law Character of Constitutional Law
The civil law tradition emphasizes statutory law — for example, taking
the form of the German Civil Code — and it relies on notions of
formalism and positivism to greatly limit judicial discretion in the
interpretation and application of legislation. This is not the way of the
common law. More than any other legal tradition, the common law has
been viewed as “the civil law’s other, the difference of its identity.”79 The
common law’s champions are judges, and its raw materials are the
particular facts of each case. The common law is inductive, and it is shaped
by the logic of analogy.
Especially in the power it bestows on judges at the expense of
legislation, constitutional law can be seen as possessing many of the
hallmarks of the common law tradition. Thomas Poole suggests that this
claim advances the idea that constitutional law is “grounded in
fundamental common law principles and is structured around the
institution of the common law court.”80 Two arguments support the claim:
First, Poole maintains that it is possible to deduce a set of values and
political commitments that are central to constitutionalism and are
uniquely expressed by the common law tradition. Second, Poole contends
that the core features of constitutional law “are most consistently
recognized and protected by the common law, particularly in the context
of judicial review.”81
Walter Murphy argues for the nexus of the common law and
constitutionalism in his article “Civil Law, Common Law, and
Constitutional Democracy.”82 “Wondering” about the viability of the new
constitutions being adopted in Eastern Europe in the 1990s,83 Murphy
78. Legrand, supra note 20, at 405.
79. Pierre Legrand, Antivonbar, 1 J. COMP. L. 13, 23 (2006).
80. Thomas Poole, Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism, 25 LEGAL STUD. 142, 142 (2005).
81. Id. at 162.
82. Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91
(1991).
83. Id. at 99–100.
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worried that the new democracies’ civil law orientation might prejudice
those heady efforts every bit as much as the East-Bloc countries’ post-war
totalitarian experiences. Had Murphy looked into the roiling constitutional
futures of Hungary and Poland? On the one hand, he noted that the “most
successful” constitutional projects were founded in common law legal
systems. On the other hand, Murphy concludes that civil law legal systems
produced repeated, dramatic constitutional failures.84 But more than just
projecting from this rough accounting of constitutional history, Murphy
advances the fundamental argument that the character of the civil law is at
odds with constitutionalism and that the character of the common law is
aligned with constitutionalism. He contrasts “the civil law’s tense
commitment to order” with the common law’s embrace of chaos.85 The
civil law, Murphy concludes, “leaves judges no respectable room to
maneuver,”86 while the common law instructs judges “to walk around
rather than try to fill in the abyss, to hunker down when the great wind
blows rather than to attempt to contain it.”87 The common law’s inductive,
case-by-case approach, Murphy concludes, involves a “supple pragmatism
over tight logic” that is inherent in the “messiness of constitutional
politics.”88
Murphy is not the only scholar to remark on the correlation between
the common law tradition and constitutionalism. Others note that the
non-textual balancing tests and constitutional standards that have
developed in constitutional jurisprudence are more akin to the common
law than to the practice of any other legal tradition. David Strauss, for
example, argues that “it is the common law approach . . . that best
explains, and best justifies, American constitutional law today.”89 Henry
84. Id. at 93. (“The preeminent constitution-making feat was pulled off more than two centuries
ago in a backward but developing country whose nascent legal systems were offshoots of the
Common Law. If we measure success by continuance over time, a pair of Common Law countries,
Canada (1867) and Australia (1900), generated the other most ‘successful’ constitutional democracies
. . . In stark contrast, Latin American countries — all consumers of the Civil Law — have changed
their constitutions with a regularity analogous to that with which modern farmers rotate crops.
Moreover, as was also the case in Mejei [sic] Japan and the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian
empires, these ‘constitutions’ have sometimes made scant pretense of trying to establish regimes that
were either democratic or limited. And when constitutional democracy was the objective in other
Civil-Law nations, as in Germany and Poland after World War I, the resulting polities were often
unstable, providing only one phase in a sequence that quickly cycled back to authoritarian rule.”).
85. Id. at 95–96.
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 96.
88. Id.
89. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996).
The notion that American constitutional law is a common law system has occurred to many. See, e.g.,
Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 470 & n.41 (1989) (reviewing
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988)); Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 228–29, 228 n.90 (identifying “adjudication”
and the “‘common law’ method” with “nonoriginalist strategies of constitutional decisionmaking”).
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Monaghan was so persuaded by the linkages that he fashioned a theory of
the “constitutional common law” that accounts for the law constitutional
courts develop, either through authoritative constitutional interpretation or
as a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing
their inspiration and authority from” the constitution.90 It is easy to see
why this uncontroversial description of the work of constitutional courts
might be seen as closely allied with the common law tradition. In fact,
Monaghan’s thesis has gained adherents in the generation since he
proposed it. More recently, Abigail Moncrieff once again confirmed that
“the judicial habit of enforcing broad constitutional norms” was precisely
the “feature of modern constitutionalism that Henry Monaghan famously
identified [as] ‘the constitutional common law.’”91 Advocates of common
law constitutionalism have described their approach as the idea “that
courts do and should develop the meaning of general or ambiguous
constitutional texts by reference to tradition and precedent, rather than
original understanding, and the related idea that courts do and should
proceed in a Burkean, rather than ambitiously rationalist or innovative
fashion.”92 The Burkean common law tradition — and its near cousin
constitutionalism — contrast sharply with the civil law tradition. Burke, of
course, is celebrated for his practical reason, which built its arguments in
response to specific political circumstances and did not aspire to the
generality, broad theory, and abstract conceptualism that characterize the
civil law.93 This very common law understanding of constitutional law

Harry H. Wellington has endorsed what he describes as a “common-law method of constitutional
interpretation.” HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 127 (1990); see also Harry H. Wellington, Common Law
Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 265–311 (1973);
JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 63–69, 218 n.112 (1981) (criticizing Wellington); 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 17–18 (1993) (describing a “Burkean sensibility” that
is “pronounced amongst practicing lawyers and judges,” but that lacks a full theoretical justification).
The “Burkean tendency” Ackerman describes — which he says is to some degree reflected in Charles
Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981), and Anthony
T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) — seems substantially
more conservative than the common law approach I defend here, which, as I will discuss below,
allows for innovation and even sudden change. Compare ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 17–18.
90. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court Term 1974 — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1975).
91. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Validity of the Individual Mandate, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2012).
92. Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1482, 1482 (2007).
93. See Francis P. Canavan, Edmund Burke’s Conception of the Role of Reason in Politics, 21 J. POL. 60,
69 (1959) (“The essential difference between Burke’s political thought and the type of thinking of
which he accused his opponents, is that he thought in terms of practical reason, and they, as he saw
it, did not. That is to say, Burke thought primarily of the end to be achieved and then of the ways of
attaining it in the given circumstances. The questions to be answered were: what do we really want?
how must we act in order to obtain it?”) (citation omitted).
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engages with two distinct claims.94 First, it accepts that judges possess
some form of latent wisdom and that they will “generally do best by
deferring to the wisdom embodied in precedent and tradition, rather than
trusting” reason.95 Second, it claims that “legal principles such as fairness
and equality reside within the common law, are constitutive of legality, and
inform (or should inform) statutory interpretation on judicial review.”96
There is no doubt, as our tour guide at the Constitutional Court
understood so well, that constitutionalism possesses many of the
characteristics of the common law tradition and that the processes
Monaghan described have emerged as the “pervasive mode of
constitutional enforcement.”97

D. The Post-War Civil Law/Common Law Clash in the German Legal Culture
If the first two premises have been confirmed, then what have been
the consequences of the emergence of a vital and effective constitutional
law regime in a German legal culture long dominated by the civil law
tradition? The third premise of this prevalent narrative is that the civil law
and the common law traditions have found themselves in conflict with one
another, vying for the soul of the German jurist.

94. See Mark D. Walters, The Common Law Constitution and Legal Cosmopolitanism, in THE UNITY
PUBLIC LAW 431 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004); J Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in Its
Second Century, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 677 (2000). But see Poole, supra note 80, at 142.
95. See Vermeule, supra note 92, at 1482; Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of
Common Law Constitutionalism, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 439 (2003) (“The essence of the
theory of common law constitutionalism is the reconfiguration of public law as a species of
constitutional politics centred on the common law court. The court, acting as primary guardian of a
society’s fundamental values and rights, assumes, on this account, a pivotal role within the polity.”).
96. Evan Fox-Decen, Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism, 55 MCGILL L.J. 511, 513
(2010); see, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF
LAW (2001).
97. Moncrieff, supra note 91, at 1248. Others have identified and discussed this trend. See Dan
T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of
Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1582 (2001); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court,
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1282–83 (2002);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596–97 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court 1996 Term — Forward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997); Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 769, 769–70 (2006) (arguing
that federalism is a good way to deal with deep and intense disagreements over individual liberty);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
888, 888–89 (2006) (making the case for state elaboration of substantive rights, at least as a way of
evolving national consensus prior to federal judicial enforcement); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199 (1976); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the
Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 399 (2010); Monaghan, supra note 90, at 2–4; Matthew C.
Stephenson, The Prices of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L. J. 2 (2008); Laurence A. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 269 (1975); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550–51 (2000).
OF

2017]

GERMANY’S GERMAN CONSTITUTION

113

In fact, that tension is on spectacular display in Karlsruhe, Germany.
On the northern edge of this charming little city known as the Hauptstadt
des Rechts (“Capital of Justice”), the “new” Constitutional Court serves as
the “protector of the Grundgesetz” from its sleek, modern, Bauhausinfluenced building. But the Constitutional Court has had to carve out a
place for itself alongside the revered Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof). From its baroque residence in a leafy neighborhood in
the southwest corner of Karlsruhe, the Federal Court of Justice, a most
civilian institution, presides as the last-instance jurisdiction over Germany’s
four great codifications, including the Civil Code. The Federal Court of
Justice, in particular, is seen as a bastion of civilian formalism and
positivism in Germany. Its judgments have been described as formulaic,
abstract, “highly conceptual, even metaphysical,” and containing “detailed
consideration of the views of contemporary (and past) academic writers.”98
That is classic civilian jurisprudence.
Knut Wolfgang Nörr characterizes this clash of cultures as a struggle
between codification and the constitution.99 There was good reason to
believe that codification would persist as the Leitbild (essence) of German
law even after the Basic Law entered into force.100 After all, Nörr explains,
“the civil code had survived the Nazi regime, at least in its outward
shape.”101 The question was whether German law “would find its identity”
by returning to codification’s formalism and positivism, or whether it
would turn to the new Basic Law and constitutionalism.102
The horizontal effect principle (Drittwirkung), fashioned early on by the
Federal Constitutional Court, is significant evidence of the struggle in the
German legal culture between the constitutional common law and the civil
law tradition. Horizontal effect refers to the application of the
constitution’s basic rights protections in the “horizontal” relationships
between equally positioned individuals. That, however, is the realm of the
Civil Code. Horizontal effect is the Basic Law’s response to the
prominence of the German Civil Code, which was thought to
comprehensively regulate these private relations. Nörr explains how
horizontal effect sought to resolve the conflict between the civil law and
constitutional law:
Of course, the question came up from which source [post-war]
norms should be taken. One usually turned to the values of the
98. BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS — A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 8–14 (4th ed. 2002).
99. See Knut Wolfgang Nörr, From Codification to Constitution: On the Changes of Paradigm in German
Legal History of the Twentieth Century, 60 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDNEIS 145 (1992).
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
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Codification, of the codes themselves to extract from them the
standards for the development of law. In this respect[,] a crucial
change occurred [after the promulgation of the Basic Law]. Certain
constitutional jurists founded the doctrine of the [Civil Code’s]
general clauses being the link between the Codification and the
Basic Rights of the Constitution [so-called “Drittwirkung der
Grundrechte”]. The doctrine maintains that also the relationship
between individuals ought to be measured to a certain extent by
the standards of the Basic Rights. Whereas according to the
traditional view the Basic Rights serve to protect the citizen against
the power of the state, now they shall protect one citizen against
the other. The Constitutional Court in 1958 adopted this theory
[in the Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198]. In this way, the Constitution
— through the general clauses of the Codification — found its
way into the Codification itself, and right into its zones of
growth.103

E. The Myth of German Constitutional Law’s Triumph over Civilian Formalism
and Positivism
According to the myth, the result of this culture clash has been
constitutional law’s victory over the civil law tradition. But constitutional
law’s triumph in Germany is just another way of saying that the common
law tradition now plays a prominent role in the German legal culture
where it is in dialogue with the still-predominant formalism and positivism
of the civil law tradition.
In many ways, this victory is Gustav Radbruch’s story. The twentiethcentury German legal philosopher’s life and work have come to embody
the prevailing myth.104 The University of Heidelberg law professor is
widely seen as having championed legal positivism alongside Kelsen and
others before the Nazis dismissed him from the university because of his
social-democratic politics.105 According to the accepted version of
events,106 the horror of witnessing the immoral uses to which the Nazis
could put Germany’s strictly formalist and positivist jurisprudence turned
Radbruch against the civilian tradition, a conversion he supposedly
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Thomas Mertens, Nazism, Legal Positivism and Radbruch's Thesis on Statutory Injustice,
14 L. & CRITIQUE 277 (2003); Thomas Mertens, But Was it Law?, 7 GER. L.J. 191 (2006); Stanley L.
Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses, 13 L. & PHIL. 313 (1994); Stanley L
Paulson, Statutory Positivism, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 1 (2007).
105. See ARTHUR KAUFMANN, GUSTAV RADBRUCH (1987); GÜNTER SPENDEL, JURIST IN
EINER ZEITENWENDE: GUSTAV RADBRUCH ZUM 100. GEBURTSTAG (1979).
106. See Stanley L. Paulson, Radbruch on Unjust Laws: Competing Earlier and Later Views?, 15
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 489 (1995).
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consecrated in his famous post-war essay, “Statutory Lawlessness and
Supra-Statutory Law” (Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht).107 In the
essay Radbruch seethes with disdain for the Nazis’ reliance on legal
positivism as a defense in their post-war criminal trials.108 The Nazis’ claim
that “‘a law is a law,’” Radbruch agonizes, “expressed the positivistic legal
thinking that, almost unchallenged, held sway over German jurists for
many decades.”109 The essay is still celebrated for Radbruch’s resounding
rejection of the positivist tradition, but it was a struggle that he said was
“being taken up everywhere.”110 Radbruch proposed a formula that would
free judges from the fetters of banal statutory interpretation and blind
application of the codes so that they might pursue supra-statutory justice.
If that sounds nothing like the civil law tradition, with its technocratic
judges unquestioningly applying the legislature’s statutes,111 then it just
might be Radbruch’s call for the ascendance of the common law.112
It is, at the same time, the triumph of constitutional law. In fact, the
Constitutional Court rather self-consciously imagines itself to be
Radbruch’s heir. The Court’s justices are the rarefied German jurists who
are at last truly free of the formalist and positivist bonds of unjust statutes.
We know this because, from its earliest decisions, the Constitutional Court
acknowledged its authority to refuse to enforce unjust laws. This
exceptional circumstance, the Court explained, would exist if the “norm in
question so evidently contradicts the principle of justice that prevails in all
formal law, such that the judge who would be applying or accepting the
legal consequences of the norm would in fact be enforcing injustice rather
than justice.”113 This is just Radbruch’s formula, which provides that “the
positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even
when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the
conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that
the statute, as ‘flawed law,’ must yield to justice.”114 And in case there was
107. Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (2006) (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans.).
108. See id. at 7.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at 6.
111. See, e.g., Hermann Kantorowicz, The Battle for Legal Science, 12 GER. L.J. 2005, 2006 (2011)
(Cory Merrill trans.) (“The reigning ideal image of the jurist is as follows: a higher civil servant with
academic training, he sits in his cell, armed only with a thinking machine, certainly one of the finest
kinds. The cell’s only furnishing is a green table on which the State Code lies before him. Present him
with any kind of situation, real or imaginary, and with the help of pure logical operations and a secret
technique understood only by him, he is, as is demanded by his duty, able to deduce the decision in
the legal code predetermined by the legislature with absolute precision.”).
112. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
113. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 17, 1953, 3
BVerfGE 58, 119 (Russell Miller trans.).
114. Paulson, supra note 106, at 491.

116

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 57:1

any doubt, the Constitutional Court explicitly invoked Radbruch’s formula
when it denied East German leaders and border guards the benefit of a
formalistic and positivistic application of the Basic Law’s prohibition on
the ex post facto application of criminal law.115 After reunification, the
complainants were convicted of murder for the shooting deaths of East
Germans attempting to flee across the border to West Germany during the
Cold War. Of course, the mortal defense of East Germany’s “anti-fascist
barrier” was legal under — and in fact was mandated by — East German
law.116 The defendants could be convicted by courts in a newly unified
Germany that were applying old West German criminal law only if they
were to reject the formalist civilian tenet providing that “a law is a law.”
That is what the ordinary courts did.117 And that is how the Constitutional
Court upheld the convictions in the Wall Shooting Case.118 The
Constitutional Court explained that the lesson of the Radbruch formula
was that the “fundamental principle of legal certainty,” which is the
promise of civilian formalism and positivism, “can be given less weight
than material justice if the law would otherwise lead to an intolerable
violation of justice.”119 The Constitutional Court’s Wall Shooting Case
decision was regarded as a profound victory for justice over civilian legal
formalism and positivism. At the same time, it was a victory for the
justices and the common law tradition that gives them priority.
The myth has no less force with respect to more commonplace
jurisprudence that does not involve the constitutional reckoning with
Germany’s totalitarian pasts. The mere exercise of unexceptional judicial
review is a species of the same common law judicial power, and it is a
significant departure from the formalist and positivist tradition in the
German legal culture that has long given priority to the Gesetzgeber (the

115. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 103(2).
116. See A. JAMES MCADAMS, JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY 23 (2001); Kif
Augustine Adams, What Is Just?: The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German
Border Guards, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 271, 289–93 (1993); Peter E. Quint, Judging the Past: The Prosecution
of East German Border Guards and the GDR Chain of Command, 61 REV. POL. 303 (1999); Peter E. Quint,
The Border Guard Trials and the East German Past-Seven Arguments, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 541 (2000).
117. Adams, supra note 116, at 297 (“Judge Seidel held that shooting to kill was authorized
under East German law. Nonetheless, he concluded, the order infringed a higher moral law.
Although the defendants were ‘at the end of a long chain of responsibility,’ they violated ‘a basic
human right’ by shooting at someone whose only crime was trying to emigrate.’ Judge Seidel applied
natural law when he argued that ‘not everything that is legal is right: There is a central area of justice,
which no law can encroach upon. The legal maxim, 'whoever flees will be shot to death' deserves no
obedience.’ Consequently, ‘[a]t the end of the 20th century, no one has the right to ignore his
conscience when it comes to killing people on behalf of the power structure.’”).
118. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 24, 1996, 95
BVerfGE 96 (1996).
119. Id. at 134–35 (1996) (Russell Miller trans.).
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“legislator”).120 The German Constitutional Court has assumed this new
role with great enthusiasm and confidence. It is no exaggeration when
scholars characterize the German Federal Constitutional Court as the
“most powerful constitutional court in the world.”121 Elsewhere, I have
remarked that the “Court’s decision-making record might suggest a
tribunal embarked on a path of relentless activism.”122 Others have simply
taken to calling reunified, post-war Germany the “Karlsruhe Republic.”123
A former Federal Justice Minister concludes that “in Germany, all power
issues have become constitutional issues,” to be resolved by the Court.124
And true to the myth, the Court is not seen as meddlesome or
overreaching. To the contrary, the Court consistently is the most respected
social institution in the country.125 In fact, the Court is widely credited with
having established democracy, the rule of law, rights protections, and
general prosperity for what seemed to be an ungovernable and
treacherously unruly German nation. As one comparative law scholar puts
it: “[T]he stability and prosperity . . . Germany enjoyed over the last half of
the 20th Century bespeaks the integrity and efficacy of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht.”126
Some now believe that constitutional law (with its common law
character) has supplanted the civil law tradition as Germany’s dominant
jurisprudential frame. Donald Kommers concludes that much of the Basic
Law’s regime derives from “the gloss the Federal Constitutional Court has
put on the text of the Basic Law,” implying a nature and style of judicial
decision-making that is much more closely attuned to the common law’s
vision of judging and that is far removed from the judicial restraint typical
of the civil law tradition.127 In a commemoration written on the twohundredth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s seminal
decision Marbury v. Madison,128 former Federal Constitutional Court Justice
120. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 5 (“The doctrine of judicial review . . . was alien to
the theory of judicial power in Germany. A judge’s only duty under the traditional German doctrine
of separation of powers was to enforce the law as written.”).
121. Kommers & Miller, supra note 8, at 210 (quoting UWE WESLE, DER GANG NACH
KARLSRUHE 7 (2004)).
122. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 35.
123. Gerhard Casper, The “Karlsruhe Republic” — Keynote Address at the State Ceremony Celebrating the
50th Anniversary of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 GER. L.J., no. 18, 2001, at para. 4,
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/volume-02-no-18.
124. Brigitte Zypries, The Basic Law at 60 — Politics and the Federal Constitutional Court, 11 GER.
L.J. 87 (2010) (citing Heinrich Wefing, Der Bonner Reflex, DIE ZEIT, Apr. 30, 2009, at 19).
125. See Peter E. Quint, Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives from the Federal Republic of
Germany, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1870 (2006); KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 39–40.
126. See Donald P. Kommers, An Introduction to the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 GER. L.J. 30, no.
9, 2001, at para. 1, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/s/GLJ_Vol_02_No_09_Kommers.pdf; see
also Kommers, supra note 13; Kommers & Miller, supra note 8.
127. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 57.
128. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem underscores the importance of constitutional
law’s counter-civilian influence in post-war German legal culture. With the
supremacy of the post-war Basic Law, as interpreted and enforced by the
Federal Constitutional Court’s justices, Hoffmann-Riem concludes that
this paradigm shift had finally and decisively overtaken Germany.
Hoffmann-Riem confirms the prominent role played by the Federal
Constitutional Court when he states that “the jurisdiction of this court is
particularly wide-ranging” and considerably greater than the review
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.129 The Federal Constitutional
Court, Hoffmann-Riem says, “has been proactive” and has “continually
expanded its identity.”130 This has placed it, unbending, in conflict with the
high federal courts.
Nörr concludes that, with the dawning of Germany’s post-war
(common law) constitutional order, “the Basic Law became the point of
reference for the [West German] legal system and in this function
superseded the Codification: for good, it seems.”131 In his estimation, and
in the estimation of our tour guide at the Constitutional Court, this has
been a definitive and irreversible paradigm shift.

III. GERMANY’S CIVILIAN CONSTITUTION
The encounter between the civil law tradition and the common law
tradition in the German legal system has not been a one-way street. It is
not just Germany’s old civilian approach to the law that has been touched
by the common law tradition; the civil law tradition has also had an
influence on German constitutional law. The gravitational pull of the civil
law tradition in Germany is simply too strong for it to have been
otherwise.
The evidence of the persistent civilian orientation of German law —
even German constitutional law — can be seen, inter alia, in the code-like
text of the Basic Law, in some theories about constitutional law in
Germany, in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, and in the
Constitutional Court’s judicial style.

A. The Basic Law as Code
In many places the text of the Basic Law has the characteristics of a
civilian code. Some provisions are famously short and open-textured, such

129. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Two Hundred Years of Marbury v. Madison: The Struggle for
Judicial Review of Constitutional Questions in the United States and Europe, 5 GER. L.J. 685, 697 (2004).
130. Id.
131. Nörr, supra note 99, at 152.
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as the terse promise in Article 1 that “human dignity shall be inviolable.”132
These provisions naturally demand a rambling, unfettered interpretive role
from the Constitutional Court. And in those places, German constitutional
law lurches decisively in the direction of the common law tradition with its
confidence in the judiciary. But many other provisions in the Basic Law
are long, detailed, and systematic, exceeding even the depth and scope of
many paragraphs of the Civil Code. These provisions, in their precision,
seem designed to prescribe a very specific constitutional result rather than
map the stars of constitutional values. These code-like constitutional
provisions necessarily limit the Constitutional Court’s interpretive room to
maneuver. The so-called “Financial Constitution,” among the Basic Law’s
other structural provisions, is especially exemplary of the Basic Law’s
civilian orientation. Article 106, as just one example, covers the
“apportionment of tax revenue” in ten subparagraphs and more than 1000
words.133 This is not a framework of broad principles to be interpreted by
the Constitutional Court in the style of the common law. It is a detailed
and definitive arrangement for revenue distribution, involving all sources
and attributable across all levels of German government. The federation,
the Basic Law tells us, is entitled to revenues generated by “the road
freight tax;”134 the states are entitled to the revenues generated by the
“motor-vehicle tax.”135 The Basic Law’s specific accounting of all tax
revenues proceeds in the same amount of detail in the rest of Article 106
and across a number of other provisions. This feels more like legislation
than constitutional law.
Several basic rights provisions also contain nearly definitive detail.
Article 7, for example, addresses the “school system” in six subparagraphs
and more than 250 words.136 Article 12a, speaking to “compulsory military
service,” involves six subparagraphs and 500 words.137 Article 13, which
provides constitutional protection for the “inviolability of the home,”
consists of seven subparagraphs and more than 400 words.138 It is a
detailed text that very clearly aspires to a systematic and comprehensive
solution to the issues involved. Article 13 is patently deductive in its
content and structure. It begins with the broad principle that the home is

132. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 1(1).
133. Id. art. 106.
134. Id. art. 106(1)[3].
135. Id. art. 106(2)[3].
136. Id. art. 7.
137. Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law], June 24, 1968,
BGBl. I art. 12a.
138. [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law] art. 13.
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sacrosanct.139 It then descends through a series of ever-more-precise
exceptions and their accompanying procedural requirements.140
American constitutional law may offer similar protection for the
sanctity of the home,141 but it does not build from a similarly concrete
textual commitment.142 The extensive regime of exceptions to that
protection have been mapped through generations of the Supreme Court’s
decisions, which mold the constitution’s meaning at its joints and in its
ambiguities.143 It would not have dawned on the drafters of the American
Fourth Amendment, steeped as they were in the common law’s judicial
suppleness, that they might have aspired to anything like the rigid and
comprehensive constitutional codification found in Article 13 of the Basic
Law.144

B. Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Codification
Theorists in Germany have embraced this codified understanding of
the constitution. Peter Unruh has explained that some constitutional
theory in Germany, under the influence of the civil law tradition, has
sought to treat the Basic Law as part of the civil law tradition.145 This
theoretical approach accepts that constitutions are not a classical example
of codification. But it insists that there is no reason why constitutions must
be treated as antithetical to civilian codification. In particular, Unruh notes,
the Basic Law creates a closed constitutional system that is similar to the
comprehensive and complete order framed by the Civil Code.146 On the
one hand, the Basic Law requires that all constitutional change occurs
through constitutional amendment. On the other hand, the Basic Law

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV.
142. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 555–56 (1996) (“Fourth Amendment theory is in
tatters at the end of the twentieth century. The disarray in the Supreme Court's recent case law has
been explored in numerous scholarly articles and judicial dissents. Two of the most common
complaints are that these opinions lack any unifying theory and fail to preserve the rights embodied
in the Amendment.”) (citations omitted).
143. Helen J. Knowles, From a Value to a Right: The Supreme Court’s Oh-So Conscious Move From
‘Privacy’ to ‘Liberty’, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 595 (2007).
144. See Stanley N. Katz, Looking Backward: The Early History of American Law [Review], 33 U. CHI.
L. REV. 867, 872 (1966) (“If one examines the actual substance of colonial law, however, it seems
difficult not to conclude that early American law was a quite sophisticated combination of English
and indigenous ideas which evolved in response to the changed conditions of life in the New World.
To notice that the common law was not transported in totality to Massachusetts does not
demonstrate that English law had no influence there. It was out of the familiar English local law that
the Puritans framed their own system.”).
145. PETER UNRUH, DER VERFASSUNGSBEGRIFF DES GRUNDGESETZE (2002).
146. Id.
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prohibits some constitutional changes.147 The result of this arrangement is
the suggestion that there is no constitutional law beyond the written text
of the Basic Law. This is not a place for judicially-conceived penumbras.
A constitution can claim to be a comprehensive and systematic regime
addressing the state’s organization as well as the relation between the
citizen and the state.148 A constitution can be civilian. In fact, the Basic
Law’s extensive coverage of the state’s financial competences in Articles
104a-115 (its more than 2000 words seeking to completely enclose the
subject) suggests that the German constitution comprehensively defines
and demarcates all state power, in the same way that a code aspires to
definitively occupy the field it governs. This is a possible reading of the
whole Basic Law, which objectively defines the individual and citizen,149
frames the boundaries for and roles of the states and the federation,150
provides for the legislative power,151 establishes the executive power,152
and institutes the judicial power.153 Very little relating to state power, and
its relationship with individuals, is left unwritten.
Similar to other codes, the Basic Law seeks to establish a reasonable,
consistent, and permanent legal order. Historically, constitutionalism
originates from the same era of Enlightenment rationality as the classical
codification in France, when Napoleon sought to give the legal system —
and society with it — a rational basis in the code.154
The Basic Law is a code in all of these respects and, consequently, is
often treated as a codification in German jurisprudence. This also involves
the approach scholars take toward constitutional law. Similar to the way
the other codes are studied, German constitutional law scholars write

147. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 79(3) (“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the
division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or
the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”).
148. Ruth Gavison, What Belongs in a Constitution?, 13 CONST. POL. ECON. 89, 89–90 (2002)
(“There are three standard candidates for inclusion in a constitution: basic governmental structures
and the relations between the main powers and functions of government; basic values and
commitments; and human rights. Some constitutions describe language and flags and other symbols.
These may either be seen as an additional group, or be seen as a part of the main commitments of
the state. In addition, a constitution usually specifies the mechanisms for its own amendment and
enforcement, and proposed constitutions often contain provisions about the mechanisms of their
adoption . . . . The main purpose and functions of constitutions are at least three. First, to both
authorize, and to create limits on, the powers of political authorities. Second, to enhance the
legitimacy and the stability of the political order. Third, to institutionalize a distinction between
‘regular politics’ and ‘the rules of the game’ and other constraints (such as human rights) within
which ordinary politics must be played.”).
149. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 116.
150. Id. arts. 20–37.
151. Id. arts. 70–82.
152. Id. arts. 54–69.
153. Id. arts. 92–104.
154. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 27–31.
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commentaries on the Basic Law.155 These commentaries pursue a
systematic exegesis of each article in the constitution. This tradition, a
distinct part of the civil law culture, has no equivalent in the United States’
common law-oriented constitutional scholarship and practice.156 Of
course, casebooks are almost unknown in Germany.157
Werner Heun explains that, in technical terms, constitutional law in
Germany has been treated as if it were codified civil law.158 Constitutional
law, Heun notes, is assessed in almost complete accordance with the
conditions of the dogmatic science that dominates the practice and study
of the codes. This can be seen in several ways. First, “the Constitution is
regarded as a predetermined normative decision, which is beyond criticism
within the system.”159 Second, constitutional analysis aims for the
“systematization of all written and unwritten rules, their interpretation and
development.”160 Third, “the interpretation of the Basic Law essentially
follows the commonly accepted classical rules and methods that were
established already by Friedrich Carl von Savigny in the early nineteenth
century.”161 This interpretive canon, similar to civilian statutory
interpretation, gives priority to text, system, structure, and teleology. Heun
explains that original intent, with its practice of divining meaning from the
ether of history and far afield from the constitutional code, “plays only a
minor role.”162 Finally, Heun notes that the “Constitutional Court,
affirmed by the overwhelming majority of scholars, has always stressed the
‘objective meaning’ of a provision.”163 This, of course, is the abstract and
conceptual approach taken to interpreting comprehensive codes.164

C. The Basic Law’s Deference to Statutory Law
The Basic Law’s civilian orientation is also evident in its preference for
legislative resolution of its interpretive ambiguities. Especially with respect
to the protection of basic rights, where the constitutional text might never
have achieved code-like detail and precision, the Basic Law often assigns
the task of rounding out the meaning of the enumerated rights to the
155. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 73.
156. See, e.g., MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 61.
157. See Basil Markesinis, Judicial Style and Judicial Reasoning in England and Germany, 59
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 294, 298–99 (2000). But see CHRISTIAM BUMKE & ANDREAS VOSSKUHLE,
CASEBOOK VERFASSUNGSRECHT (7th ed. 2017).
158. WERNER HEUN, THE CONSTITUTION OF GERMANY: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 5
(2010).
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Markesinis, supra note 157, at 296–99.
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legislature. The common law solution to these uncertainties is to entrust
the matter to the courts. The approach adopted by the Basic Law,
however, denies the Constitutional Court the fullest possible authority
over the Basic Law’s meaning. The civil law’s confidence in legislation —
and its distrust for the judiciary — is unmistakable in this arrangement.165
The Constitutional Court is not troubled by its subordination: “The
Court has . . . stated on numerous occasions that it will not substitute its
judgment of sound or wise public policy for that of the legislature.”166
Thus, the Court exercises significant restraint when reviewing legislation
that is enacted pursuant to the legislature’s authority to define and limit
constitutional law, despite the fact that the legislation directly touches
upon the enjoyment of a basic right. One example of this framework can
be found in Article 5, which provides for “[f]reedom of expression, arts,
and sciences.”167 The freedom of expression, information, and press that is
unequivocally asserted by the article’s first subparagraph is framed by the
second subparagraph, which gives the legislature the central role in
defining the scope of the right: “These rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young
persons, and in the right to personal honour.”168 The Court’s role when
reviewing these constitutionally ordained legislative limits on the freedom
of expression is largely to assess them for their proportionality.169 That,
however, is not the same thing as judging the substance of the parliament’s
decisions about the scope of and limits on the freedom of expression. In
terms that simply radiate with the residual ethos of the civil law tradition,
Hans Jarass explains that, “for the exercise of basic rights, fundamental
questions must be settled by the parliament.”170

D. The Nature of the Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction
The civilian orientation of German constitutional law is also apparent
in the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. First, that the Court does not
have discretion to select the cases it will review suggests that its decisions
— although profoundly influential — do not formally establish
precedent.171 Precedential authority, however, is a central feature of the
165. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], arts. 2(2), 4(3), 5(2), 8(2), 10(2), 11(2), 14(1).
But see id. art. 19(2).
166. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 34–35.
167. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 5.
168. Id. art. 5(2).
169. Hans Jarass, Art. 5, in GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND —
KOMMENTAR margin no. 57 (Hans Jarass & Bodo Pieroth eds., 10th ed. 2009).
170. Id. at margin no. 55.
171. Kommers, supra note 13, at 845 (“[T]he Federal Constitutional Court is not formally bound
to the rule of stare decisis. In the culture of Germany’s code law world . . . judicial decisions do not
enjoy the status of law as in the common law world.”).
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common law’s embrace of judicial law-making.172 Second, the Court’s
abstract review jurisdiction anticipates constitutional judgments that will be
taken wholly on the basis of the abstract legal principles involved and
without reference to the specific facts of a discrete and actual
controversy.173 This is the civil law’s deductive approach to law and not
the common law’s inductive, case-specific orientation.

E. The Constitutional Court’s Civilian Decisional Style
The Constitutional Court’s decisional style also suggests the strong
influence the civil law tradition maintains over German constitutional law.
Maybe this should not be surprising. After all, the Federal Constitutional
Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) provides that eight of the Court’s
justices must have served as judges at the federal high courts, such as the
Federal Court of Justice.174 These federal high courts sit as the last instance
of review in disputes arising out of distinct code regimes, including the
Civil Code. Judges reach these prestigious ranks of the judiciary by having
demonstrated mastery over the civilian application and interpretation of
codified law.
The Constitutional Court’s decisions unwaveringly hew to a formulaic
structure that seems to yearn for the systematic and orderly nature of the
civil law, even in the midst of the chaos and liberty that judges confront in
the constitutional common law. Every one of the Constitutional Court’s
judgments follows the same pattern: In Section A., the Court provides an
objective presentation of the relevant law, facts, and procedural
background, as well as the arguments of complainants. In Section B., the
Court provides an objective presentation of the respondents’ arguments
and the presentations made at a hearing (if one was held), including the
contributions to the proceeding from experts in the relevant facts and law.
In Section C., the Court announces and justifies its decisions regarding
admissibility and the merits of the case. Anyone familiar with the rambling,
unsystematic, facts-heavy judicial style of the United States Supreme
Court’s judgments is immediately struck by the systematic, abstract, and
rational structure of the Constitutional Court’s decisions.

172. See, e.g., Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1936)
(“Distinguishing characteristics are [the common law’s] development of law by a system of judicial
precedent, its use of the jury to decide issues of fact, and its all-pervading doctrine of the supremacy
of law . . . .”).
173. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], art. 93(1)[2]; see also CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER &
CHRITOPH GOOS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 207–37 (4th ed. 2015).
174. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], art. 94(1); see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13,
at 22–24; Rudolf Streinz, The Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Law and Politics, 31
RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 95, 102 (2014).
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The following practices also confirm the Constitutional Court’s civilian
understanding of constitutional law because they reinforce the law’s
abstract or conceptual nature. First, the Court almost always reaches its
decisions by unanimous judgments.175 This helps to avoid the impression
that constitutional decision-making is a matter of the justices’ personal or
political preferences. Constitutional law is presented as a coherent and
objective normative framework. It does not appear, as is often the case in
the judgments of the United States Supreme Court, as a pluralistic and
disputed enterprise that lurches toward results only through sometimesfragile majorities of the justices. The Constitutional Court justices have
had a right to publish dissenting opinions since the early 1970s, but, in
keeping with the civil law’s principled conceptualism, they rarely do so.176
Second, the Court has developed highly systematized approaches to its
practice in the areas of constitutional interpretation that otherwise would
have demanded the greatest discretion and flexibility. In this way, the
Court has sought to limit and restrain its role in ways that resonate with
the civil law tradition’s suspicion of judicial power.
The Court invariably approaches the review of alleged basic rights
violations by resorting to a formula prominently promoted by the scholars
Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink (now joined by Thorsten Kingreen
and Ralf Poscher).177 Adjudicating the constitution’s basic rights might
have involved a nearly unbounded jurisprudential practice, especially when
one considers that the broad textual framing rights, such as dignity,
personality, and equality, must be given. But the Court has yoked itself to a
three-part formula that gives its work in this context the feeling of
objectivity and scientific inquiry. In the first step, the Court begins by
defining the scope of the asserted constitutional protection. This, for
example, requires the Court to answer the question “to whom or what
does the basic right apply?” In the second step, the Court assesses whether
there has been a direct or indirect encroachment upon the protectable
scope of the basic right. In the third step, the Court determines whether an
encroachment on the basic right has been justified. This, in turn, requires
the Court to follow one of two systematic paths: one for rights that can be
limited by statute178 and another for rights that are absolute.179 Each of
these tracks involves a distinct, systematized assessment.
175. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 28–29.
176. See id; see also Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfG], Jahresstatistik [Yearly Statistics] 2016—
Senatsentscheidungen mit oder ohne Sondervotum in der amtlichen Sammlung [Senate Judgments in
the Official Reports with or without Dissenting Opinions], BVERFGE, Bände 30–140 (1971–2016),
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Verfahren/Jahresstatistiken/2016/gb2016/A-I7.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (listing 162 dissents in forty-five years).
177. BODO PIEROTH ET AL., GRUNDRECHTE — STAATSRECHT II (30th ed. 2014).
178. See Kommers, supra note 13, at 857 (“A close look at the Basic Law discloses an interesting
hierarchy of rights. Some are cast in unqualified language . . . .”).

126

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 57:1

The central component of step three (the determination whether an
encroachment is justified) is the application of the proportionality principle
for which the Court is well-known.180 The proportionality principle might
be characterized as an open-ended balancing test that gives the justices
unchecked and dangerously subjective discretion to assign “weight” to
competing interests and to reach conclusions on the basis of an
unsystematic balancing exercise.181 There is some truth in this critique, but
the criticism should grapple with the Constitutional Court’s highly
methodical approach to proportionality analysis. In fact, in the system
developed by the Court, the proportionality principle involves balancing or
weighing only as the last of four steps in the analysis.182 Before
determining whether measures that encroach upon basic rights are
proportional to the benefits they are intended to produce, the Court must
first examine whether the measures are legitimate, suitable, and necessary.
The Court faithfully resolves each of these threshold standards before
taking up the less-bounded challenge of balancing or weighing interests.183

IV. CONCLUSION
My American law students were relieved to hear the tour guide’s claim
that the German Constitutional Court was the country’s common law
tribunal. Implied in the claim was the idea that the entire German legal
culture was now keyed to the common law. After all, whatever else the
American students might have understood about their visit to the Court in
Karlsruhe, they knew that the Constitutional Court is Germany’s most
powerful and important judicial organ. The common law — the tour guide
179. See id. (“All other rights are conditional, and they fall into three categories. First are those
rights which can only be limited by the terms of the Basic Law itself . . . . The second category of
conditional rights are those whose contours are to be defined by law . . . . Finally, certain rights may
be restricted by the ‘general laws.’ The reference here is to the general provisions of the civil and
criminal code.”).
180. See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U.
TORONTO L.J. 383 (2007).
181. See Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the
Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights, and Federalism, 1 J. CONST. L. 583, 603–04 (1999) (quoting
William Stuntz as asserting, “There is no nonarbitrary way to arrive at the proper legal rules, no way
to get to sensible bottom lines by something that looks and feels like legal analysis. Whether
proportionality review is lodged in appellate or trial courts, the only way to do it is to do it, to decide
that this sentence is too great but not that one. There is no metric for determining right answers, no
set of analytical tools that defines what a given sentence ought to be”).
182. See Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 135
(2003).
183. See Grimm, supra note 180, at 387 (“Only a legitimate purpose can justify a limitation of a
fundamental right . . . . [T]he German Court asks whether the law is suitable to reach its end[,]
whether the law is necessary to reach its end or whether a less intrusive means exists that will likewise
reach the end[, and t]he third step . . . is a cost-benefit analysis, which requires a balancing between
the fundamental rights interests and the good in whose interest the right is limited.”).
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wanted them to believe — now radiates across all German law. This put
the young American jurists on stable and familiar ground. It was a
different country and a different legal tradition, the sentiment ran, but at
least when it comes to constitutional law we speak the same (common law)
language. It must have been the familiarity that the tour guide sought to
engender with her remark that emboldened that group of too-oftenreluctant students to join the discussion about the Court with real interest
and vigor. The questions they raised quickly exposed the problems with
the tour guide’s claim about the Constitutional Court’s common law
orientation. “Who is the best known justice?” one of the students asked.
The tour guide explained that the Court’s President often has a significant
public profile. But she noted that the Constitutional Court’s justices,
mostly working anonymously and unanimously, do not enjoy anything like
the celebrity of the United States Supreme Court justices. “What was her
favorite dissenting opinion?” another student asked. The justices of the
Constitutional Court are rarely divided in their votes, the tour guide
explained. And when they are, it is even rarer for the dissenters to write a
separate opinion. “What is the Court’s process for deciding which cases it
will consider?” a third student asked. The tour guide explained that the
Constitutional Court doesn’t select the cases on its docket, but must
decide all admissible cases. Another student asked, “What are the
standards the Court follows if it wants to abandon its own precedent?”
The tour guide explained that the Constitutional Court does not follow the
common law doctrine of stare decisis. The magic of the earlier moment,
stirred when the tour guide declared the Court to be Germany’s only
common law tribunal, was waning. Maybe it was the bank of clouds that
had crept in front of the sun and muted the glow of the Constitutional
Court’s hearing chamber. But one of my students put it more bluntly.
“Well,” she said, “this doesn’t sound like any common law court I’m
familiar with.”
Constitutional law has not only been the vehicle for the common law’s
triumph over civilian formalism and positivism in the post-War German
legal culture as the prevailing myth would suggest. German constitutional
law has also been colored by the still-predominant civil law tradition. In
fact, German constitutional law is distinctly and significantly civilian in
character and style. This is nothing more than the symbiotic interchange
between legal traditions that H. Patrick Glenn envisioned. The
continuously evolving mix of these traditions — as well as of history,
politics, and culture — leaves us undeniably with Germany’s uniquely
German constitutional law. It suggests that any credible study of German
constitutional law must account for the German constitutional regime’s
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civilian orientation and a potentially infinite array of other “traces.”184
More broadly, my thesis serves as a warning for comparative lawyers who
might be tempted to neglect a particular constitutional culture’s unique
socio-legal frame in pursuit of comparisons that rely on generalized or
universal notions of constitutionalism. It is all marvelously more complex
than that.

184. See Legrand, supra note 20.
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